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Abstract
One core assumption of standard economic theory is that an individual’s preferences are stable, irrespective of the method 
used to elicit them. This assumption may be violated if preference reversals are observed when comparing different methods 
to elicit people’s preferences. People may then prefer A over B using one method while preferring B over A using another. 
Such preference reversals pose a significant problem for theoretical and applied research. We used a sample of medical and 
economics students to investigate preference reversals in the health and financial domain when choosing patients/clients. We 
explored whether preference reversals are associated with domain-relevant training and tested whether using guided ‘choice 
list’ elicitation reduces reversals. Our findings suggest that preference reversals were more likely to occur for medical stu-
dents, within the health domain, and for open-ended valuation questions. Familiarity with a domain reduced the likelihood 
of preference reversals in that domain. Although preference reversals occur less frequently within specialist domains, they 
remain a significant theoretical and practical problem. The use of clearer valuation procedures offers a promising approach 
to reduce preference reversals.
Keywords Choice · Decision making for others · Preference elicitation · Preference imprecision · Preference reversals
Introduction
The elicitation of preferences, i.e. finding out if one pre-
fers A over B or vice versa, is central in economics and, 
therefore, relevant to many topics studied in health econom-
ics, such as health state valuations, multi-criterion decision 
analysis [8], patient preferences [55], and studies on physi-
cian behaviour [38]. Many different methods are used to 
elicit preferences in the relevant target group, including 
well-known methods like willingness to pay [40], time trade-
off (e.g. [24], and discrete choice experiments (e.g. [33]).
A disturbing finding is that different preference orderings 
may be obtained, especially when using different methods. 
This phenomenon is typically referred to as preference rever-
sal. For example, people may prefer option A over B when 
directly asked to choose between them but have a higher 
willingness to pay for B than for A [34, 60]. To illustrate, 
imagine a person who, when given a direct choice, indicates 
that she prefers surgery over physiotherapy for a given con-
dition. Given this observation, we would, ceteris paribus, 
expect her to also be willing to pay more (or at least not 
less) for surgery than for physiotherapy. If this is the case, 
her preferences could be classified as consistent. In practice, 
however, her willingness to pay for physiotherapy may turn 
out to be higher than that for surgery. This may be classified 
as inconsistent and constitutes a preference reversal. If such 
preference reversals occur, preferences may not be stable, 
but depend on and can reverse between different elicitation 
methods and procedures. As a result, it is no longer pos-
sible to determine which (if any) method yields ‘true’ pref-
erences [17]. Hence, preference reversals offer substantial 
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methodological challenges, but also form a general and fun-
damental problem to applied work and decision-making in 
health and other settings.
Unfortunately, preference reversals appear to be a robust 
phenomenon, which typically occurs when comparing pref-
erences for risky outcomes elicited using different methods 
[56] or different operationalisations of the same method [6]. 
In a classic example, Slovic and Lichtenstein [47] offered 
subjects two risky lotteries, referred to as the P-bet and the 
$-bet. The former included a high chance of a moderate 
reward (e.g. 95% chance of winning 40$, or lose 10$ oth-
erwise), while the latter involved a lower chance of a high 
reward (e.g. 15% chance of winning 160$ or lose 15$ oth-
erwise). Preferences were first elicited using direct choice, 
i.e. subjects were asked to indicate which lottery they would 
choose. Next, subjects were asked to indicate the monetary 
values they would assign to both lotteries, i.e. their valua-
tion. Slovic and Lichtenstein [47] found that for lotteries 
with similar expected values, subjects chose the P-bet over 
the $-bet, but assigned a higher monetary value to the $-bet 
compared to the P-bet. This finding has been replicated fre-
quently (e.g. [36, 53, 56]) and constitutes a preference rever-
sal, as economic theory predicts that the preferred lottery 
should also have been assigned a higher valuation.
By now, preference reversals have been studied exten-
sively for monetary outcomes, using many different settings 
and methods (for a review, see: [56]). Preference reversals 
in decisions related to health outcomes have been docu-
mented in several studies as well [14, 49, 50, 52, 57]. To 
our knowledge, the only study directly comparing preference 
reversals in choices regarding health and money is that of 
Oliver and Sunstein [51], who found a higher rate of prefer-
ence reversals for health. Given that preference reversals 
pose a significant methodological and practical problem, 
improving our understanding of causes and potential ways 
to reduce preference reversals in different contexts remains 
crucial. Hence, we report the findings of an experiment in 
which preferences were elicited in a sample consisting of 
both medical and economics students for both health and 
monetary outcomes. This experiment expands earlier work 
in two directions.
First, in the seminal work by Lichtenstein and Slovic [47], 
preference reversals were demonstrated by comparing direct 
choice and valuation, where the latter was obtained with 
open-ended questions. Subsequent work, instead, obtained 
valuations through choice-based procedures and has shown 
this reduces preference reversal [7, 10, 16, 42, 48]. Further-
more, Oliver [50] argued that people are unlikely to have 
fixed preferences for unfamiliar goods and may use unstable 
heuristics when asked to value them using open valuation. 
As a result, there have been attempts to simplify open-ended 
valuation elicitation for respondents. For example, Oliver 
[50] tried an assisted valuation procedure by presenting 
respondents a selection of amounts to pay for a risky opera-
tion but found no notable differences with open valuation. 
In this study, we continue this line of research by using 
choice list elicitation (as popularised by [41] for valuation. 
This choice-based method for preference elicitation is often 
applied in behavioral and experimental economics as it is 
easy to explain and implement [2].
Second, while some authors have explored preference 
reversals from the perspective of a social planer [9, 60], 
preference reversals in decisions on behalf of others have 
received little attention (see [50], for an exception). Investi-
gating preference reversal in this area may be an important 
avenue for health economics research, as for many real-life 
decisions about health, one often has to rely on the advice 
and actions of others, e.g. physicians proposing preferred 
treatment options. Indeed, Arrow [4] identified the reliance 
on physicians’ expertise as one of the main reasons for a sep-
arate study of the economics of health. Similarly, one may 
also rely on experts in decisions about money, e.g. financial 
experts selecting investment portfolios. In both the health 
and monetary domain, the outcomes of decisions made by 
those with different or more expertise in a particular field 
have been extensively studied (e.g. [1, 15, 22, 27, 39, 46]). 
In this paper, instead, we extend this research by studying 
the consistency of decision-making, and by extension focus 
on an entirely new aspect of the preference reversal phenom-
enon: the consistency of those advising others inside (and 
outside) their field of expertise. In our experiment, consist-
ency is tested with students from different disciplines, and 
throughout this paper, we will refer to any effects related 
to deciding in a domain relevant to their respective field of 
study as domain-relevant training.
Note that although some evidence exists suggesting that 
students and physiciancs have similar preferences [18], stu-
dents are obviously still training to become experts. Besides 
their field of study, the two groups of students in our study 
may also differ in terms of skills and traits. For instance, 
those that precede and affect self-selection into different 
educational tracks, like the wish to help others in medical 
students (e.g. [29, 32]). Furthermore, earlier studies have 
aimed to implement a real patient benefit into the decision-
making process to create real incentives, for example by 
transforming the patient health benefits into a monetary 
amount that is then donated to a charity [3, 18, 19, 39, 44, 
45]. Our work instead uses hypothetical scenarios for both 
health and monetary decisions. This lack of incentive-com-
patibility may be seen as a limitation [30], but it enabled us 
to study preference reversals for decisions involving realis-
tic stakes of moderate size in both domains (as in [51]). In 
particular, we aimed to describe a scenario that reflected the 
medicial decision context as realistic as possible. Convert-
ing the benefits in the scenarios to real health gains through 
donations to some health-related charity would likely result 
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in very small and uncertain health gains, of a different nature 
than the ones studied here. This may also negatively affect 
the comparability between the two domains. Hence, also in 
order to prevent apparent procedural differences between 
health and money, preferences were elicited with hypotheti-
cal and relatively large and realistic stakes throughout the 
entire experiment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; 
firstly, we will form hypotheses for our study. We then con-
tinue to explain our experimental procedure in the methods 
section and finish with presenting our results and discussing 
them in the context of the literature.
Hypotheses for effects of choice list 
elicitation and domain‑relevant training
Preference reversals are often explained by overpricing 
of the $-Bet (i.e. low chance to gain a high outcome) as a 
result of scale compatibility [59]. This hypothesis suggests 
that people focus on different aspects of lotteries depending 
on the elicitation method. In direct choice, they give more 
attention to probabilities, which benefits the P-Bet (i.e. the 
high chance of winning a moderate amount), as this bet has 
a higher chance of yielding a positive result. In valuation, 
operationalised by using open-ended questions (e.g. “For 
what price would you sell this lottery?”), subjects focus 
on the unit in which they should express their valuation. 
In the study by Tversky et al. [59], this focus on monetary 
amounts favours the $-Bet and therefore could explain the 
relatively high rates of preference reversals. If rather than 
open-ended questions, choice list elicitation is applied, both 
direct choice and valuation would involve choice. Seeing as 
earlier work has consistently shown that preference reversals 
are lower when valuation is choice based [7, 10, 16, 42, 48], 
we formed our first hypothesis (H1):
H1: The use of choice list elicitation will lead to fewer 
preference reversals.
Furthermore, it is well-known that preference elicitation 
(for risk) may contain noise or imprecision [12], which may 
be more likely if preferences are elicited for outcomes that 
one has no decision experience with or interest in. Accord-
ing to Butler and Loomes [20, 21], indicating the value of 
a risky gamble, such as a P-bet or $-bet (i.e. by providing a 
certainty equivalent) is a difficult task which leads to impre-
cision, and this imprecision may explain part of the systema-
ticity of preference reversals. Hence, the relatively high rates 
of preference reversal observed in earlier studies on health 
outcomes [14, 49–51, 57], may partly be explained by the 
fact that most samples in these studies are generally unfa-
miliar with decisions about health. Indeed, Beshears et al. 
[11] indicate that a lack of experience and choice complexity 
increase the occurrence of decision-making errors in pref-
erence studies (such as preference reversals). Pinto‐Prades 
et al. [52] provided more support for the role of imprecision 
in producing preference reversals by showing how prefer-
ence reversals for health outcomes can be reduced by repeat-
ing preference elicitations. Hence, domain-relevant training 
may reduce preference reversal by reducing such impreci-
sion, as students through their (selection into) domain-rel-
evant training may be more familiar with considering out-
comes in one domain rather than another. Thus, our second 
hypothesis (H2) is:
H2: Participants with domain-relevant training will 




To ensure that every participant had at least some prior expe-
rience with choices in one of the domains, we aimed to only 
recruit economics, business and medical students beyond 
their first year of studies. Several screening questions were 
in place, to avoid recruiting students that did not meet these 
conditions. Our full sample of 252 students was comprised 
of 129 medical students, 121 business and economics stu-
dents (henceforth: economics students) and two other stu-
dents (removed from the sample). Additionaly, two students 
were excluded who reported being in their first year of stud-
ies, yielding a final sample of 248 students. Recruitment of 
these students differed depending on their discipline. Eco-
nomics and business studentswere recruited from the subject 
pool of the experimental laboratory at Erasmus School of 
Economics, while medical students were recruited through 
messages in the virtual learning environment of two Univer-
sity Medical Centres (in Rotterdam and Leiden). Subjects 
were paid a flat fee of 10 Euros (paid out as a gift voucher) 
for participating in the experiment. Both groups of students 
completed an online experiment, which was operationalised 
in Qualtrics Survey Software, with a two by two within-
subjects factorial design applied in two samples, using the 
following two factors: i) outcome domain (health vs finan-
cial), and ii) valuation procedure (open-ended vs choice 
list).1 This design allows us to study preference reversals 
within-subjects in four blocks and allows between-subjects 
comparisons based on discipline (i.e. economics or medi-
cine). An overview of our experimental design is provided 
1 We also piloted a condition aimed at reducing preference reversals 
by using natural frequencies to communicate risks, but due to a pro-
gramming error this data could not be included.
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in Fig. 1. To avoid ordering and learning effects the order of 
outcome domains and valuation procedures was randomised.
Experimental procedure
The online experiment started with general instructions 
and a practice block (see Appendix A). Afterwards, par-
ticipants completed a total of 12 questions eliciting their 
preferences for health and investment decisions (on behalf 
of others) with one choice and two valuation questions for 
each condition. Both scenarios began with an introduction 
page informing participants which role they would have 
in the experiment that followed. Graphical elements were 
added to inform respondents which type of question they 
were answering and to reduce the repetitiveness of the ques-
tions. After completing the 12 questions, demographics were 
collected. More specifically, we collected information on 
age, gender, statistical competency, and year of study (see 
Appendix B for an overview of questions used).
Eliciting preference reversals
The questions per condition all followed a similar structure, 
following the classic study by Slovic and Lichtenstein [47] 
: i) a strict choice between two risky lotteries with similar 
expected values (henceforth P-bet and $-bet), ii) valuation 
of P-bet, iii) valuation of $-bet (for an overview of P-bets 
and $-bets used, see Table 1). The order of these three ques-
tions was randomised within each condition. We recorded a 
preference reversal if a respondent chose the P-bet over the 
$-bet in the direct choice, but at the same time valued the 
$-bet strictly higher in the valuation question. This com-
monly observed reversal pattern is usually referred to as a 
‘predicted preference reversal’, as it is predicted by scale 
compatibility [59]. Preferring the $-bet while assigning a 
strictly larger value to the P-bet is defined as an ‘unpredicted 
preference reversal’. We will interpret subjects indicating to 
prefer one bet in direct choice while assigning it a higher or 
equal value in valuation as having consistent preferences.
Operationalisation of outcome domains (health vs 
financial)
In both domains, respondents hypothetically advised a 
person on a decision between two risky prospects. In the 
financialscenario, respondents advised clients on how to 
invest their money in different portfolios. The health sce-
nario involved recommending treatment options for a 
terminally ill patient, where the patient health status was 
described by using the dimensions of the EQ-5D instru-
ment (see Appendix A for exact instructions). Whereas in 
the original set-up by Slovic and Lichtenstein [47] , which 
was extended to health outcomes by [49, 50], risky prospects 
were two-outcome mixed gambles (consisting of a gain and 
a loss), Table 1 shows that the P-bets and $-bets in this study 
used three outcomes. The third outcome was included to 
increase realism,2 as both investment and medical decisions 
Fig. 1  Survey design of the 
two domains and valuation 
procedures
2 To check the realism of our P-bets ($-bets) and the instructions 
used for medical decision-making, we consulted a physician. Some 
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typically have at least three outcomes: a gain (high return on 
investment or medical treatment is successful), ‘the status 
quo’ (moderate return on investment or medical treatment 
is unsuccessful), and a loss (portfolio value decreases or 
side-effects of medical treatments). In each question, graphi-
cal elements like those in Fig. 1 were used to emphasise 
(changes to) the outcome domain and valuation procedure 
being used.
Operationalisation of valuation procedure (open‑ended vs 
choice list)
For health outcomes, open-ended valuation was operation-
alised as follows: students were instructed to compare the 
P-bet ($-bet) to a treatment yielding some amount of life 
years in perfect health for certain, where students were 
asked to provide the minimum amount of life years that 
would lead them to recommend patients to take this certain 
treatment over the P-bet ($-bet). For financial outcomes, 
the open-ended valuation was operationalised as follows: 
students were asked to compare the P-bet ($-bet) to a gov-
ernment bond yielding a sure gain and asked to indicate 
how large this gain should be for the bond to be equally 
good to the P-bet ($-bet). In both outcome domains, students 
were required to provide this certain amount of life years 
or money in an open answer field, i.e., students reported a 
certainty equivalent. Choice list valuation was operational-
ised by offering respondents a list of increasing amounts of 
money (in increments of 1000$, followed by a choice list 
in 100$ increments) or life years (in yearly increments) to 
choose from. Figure 2 shows an example of such a choice 
list valuation procedure for valuation of a P-bet, where at 
some point students switch from preferring the P-bet to a 
certain outcome. As is usual in choice list methodology [41], 
the certainty equivalent is obtained by taking the average of 
the certain outcome above and below the switching point 
(see Fig. 2 for examples). This procedure was guided as the 
choice lists were programmed to prohibit multiple switching 
points and choices that violated dominance.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Sample characteristics for these two groups of students can 
be found in Table 2. Comparisons between the two groups 
yielded some significant differences, showing that econom-
ics students (relative to medical students) were more likely 
to be male, and reported being in a higher study year and 
more competent in statistics.
Table 1  P-bets and $-bets used for health and financial outcomes in all four conditions
minor changes were made to the framing (e.g. we increased the age 
of the patient whom students are to imagine they would be advising).
Footnote 2 (continued)
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Fig. 2  Hypothetical response to 
choice list valuation of a $-bet 
(financial) and P-bet (health), 
yielding certainty equivalents of 
4500$ and 3.5 years, respec-
tively
Table 2  Sample characteristics 
by study discipline
1 indicating “I had no statistical training”, 2 “I feel somewhat competent with statistics”, 3 “I know my way 
around statistics, but I’m not an expert”, 4 “I feel competent in statistics”, 5 “My specialization is statis-
tics”.
Economics (n = 119) Medicine (n = 129) Total (n = 248) Econ vs. Medical
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Age 21.60 1.94 21.43 2.24 21.51 2.10
Stat. comp. 2.94 1.02 2.51 0.82 2.72 0.94 p < 0.02














Table 3  Overall frequency 
distribution for combinations 
of preferences per condition, 
observations and (%)
The pattern P$ indicates that the P-bet was chosen in the choice task, but that the $-bet was valued strictly 
higher in the valuation task, while $P indicates the reverse pattern. PP and $$ indicate a choice for a bet 
that was valued at least as good or higher (i.e. no inconsistency)
Pattern Health Financial Inter-pretation
Open-ended Choice list Open-ended Choice list 
P$ 147 (59.3%) 120 (48.4%) 137 (55.2%) 94 (37.9%) Predicted reversal
$P 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.2%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (1.2%) Unpredicted reversal
PP 77 (31.0%) 89 (35.9%) 82 (33.1%) 85 (34.3%) Consistent
$$ 24 (9.7%) 36 (14.5%) 28 (11.3%) 66 (26.6%) Consistent
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Preference reversals for each scenario were first analysed 
descriptively by creating a dummy variable, which indicated 
if a preference reversal occurred or not. Table 3 shows the 
overall results of this online experiment, which indicate that 
predicted preference reversals were the most occurring com-
bination of preferences in all conditions. Furthermore, only 
very few unpredicted preference reversals occurred, rep-
resenting just over 1% of all combinations of preferences. 
Hence, we will study both reversals combined, and for brev-
ity refer to these as ‘the rate of preference reversal’.
Comparisons by students’ discipline, outcome 
domain, and valuation procedure
We compared preference reversals by study discipline, out-
come domain and valuation procedure using chi-squared 
tests. When we sum preference reversals (i.e. predicted and 
unpredicted), we find that combined for all conditions, fewer 
reversals occurred in the financial domain than in health, 
economics students show fewer reversals than medical stu-
dents and fewer reversals occur when choice lists are used 
compared to open valuation (see Table 4).
When comparing rates of preference reversals between-
subjects (see Table 5), we note that for open valuation, an 
effect of domain-relevant training appeared to occur. Eco-
nomics students had a significant 14.6 pp difference between 
financial and health outcomes using open valuation (9.8 pp 
using choice lists) and were, as expected, more consistent in 
the financial domain (their area of expertise).
Using choice list valuation, both economics and medi-
cine students were more consistent compared to open valu-
ation (i.e., showing lower rates of preference reversal). The 
most substantial reductions in the rate of preference rever-
sals through choice lists could be observed outside of the 
respondent’s area of expertise. The rate of preference rever-
sals of economics students using choice lists was 16.2 pp 
lower in the medical domain as opposed to an 11.4 pp reduc-
tion in the financial domain. Medical students showed a non-
significant 4.7 pp reduction in the rate of preference rever-
sals in the health domain and a significant 20.2 pp reduction 
in the financial domain when preferences were elicited with 
choice lists.
To substantiate our descriptive findings further, we ran 
a logistic mixed-effects regression, which allowed us to 
determine to what extent the chance of observing a prefer-
ence reversal was affected by our experimental conditions. 
Table 6 shows the results for a logistic regression model 
with random subject effects and fixed effects for a) domain 
(financial vs health), b) discipline (economics vs medical 
students), c) procedure (choice list vs open-ended valuation, 
d) domain-relevant training (domain × discipline interac-
tion) and e) interaction term for procedure and discipline. 
These analyses showed that preference reversals are more 
likely to occur a) in the health domain, b) for decisions by 
medicine students, and c) for open valuations (as opposed to 
Table 4  Reversals rates by domain, training and procedure
Domain Health Financial 2
Rate of reversal 54.4% 47.6% p < 0.05
Training Medicine Economics 2
123 Rate of reversal 56.6% 45.1% p < 0.001
Procedure Open Val Choice list 2
Rate of reversal 57.5% 44.4% p < 0.001
Table 5  Reversal rates between subjects
Economics students Medical students
Rate of reversal Open Valuation Choice List 2(method) Rate of reversal Open Valuation Choice List 2 (method)
Health domain 59.3% 43.1% p < 0.05 Health domain 59.7% 55.0% p = 0.450
Financial domain 44.7% 33.3% p < 0.10 Financial domain 65.9% 45.7% p < 0.05

2 (domain) p < 0.05 p < 0.05 2 (domain) p = 0.303 p = 0.135
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choice list elicitation). Furthermore, we observed a margin-
ally significant interaction between discipline and domain 
(i.e., the effect of domain-relevant training): medical stu-
dents were less likely to show preference reversals in their 
‘own domain’. Importantly, when exploring the robustness 
of our findings, we found that our main findings were mostly 
unaffected by controlling for demographics and order effects. 
The results of these analyses can be found in Appendix C.
Discussion
This study investigated whether domain-relevant training, 
gathered through selecting into and exposure to education to 
become a physician or economist, and choice list elicitation 
procedures reduced the rate of preference reversal in deci-
sion making for others for both health and money. Given that 
we studied preference reversals for both health and financial 
outcomes, the results of this study can be compared to the 
extant literature in these two domains. Overall, we find pref-
erence reversals to occur frequently with strictly reversed 
preferences occurring in 32–66% of the sample, depending 
on the condition. These high rates of (predicted) preference 
reversals are in accordance with earlier studies for financial 
outcomes [34, 47] and health [49–51, 57]. Some studies, 
often with designs that deviate more from the original set-up 
used by Lichtenstein and Slovic [47], find somewhat lower 
rate rates of preference reversals – especially for health (e.g. 
[14]). Oliver and Sunstein [51] compared preference rever-
sals for health and money (and other domains) using differ-
ent samples for each domain and found higher overall rates 
of preference reversal for health, which we confirmed in our 
study with direct within-subjects comparisons. Furthermore, 
for three out of four between-subjects comparisons, prefer-
ence reversals occurred more frequently for health.
In addition, our design allowed comparing open-ended 
valuations and computer-assisted choice lists. The latter 
has only recently been introduced in preference elicitation 
in health economics (e.g. [3, 5, 28, 43, 52]). In line with 
our first hypothesis, we found that choice-based valuations, 
using guided choice list elicitation, reduced the rate of pref-
erence reversals for both health and money. Hence, our find-
ings confirm earlier work for health [7] and money [10, 16]. 
Moreover, it appears that choice lists yield a lower rate of 
preference reversals when they are used in a domain that is 
unfamiliar to the respondent. This would make choice lists 
elicitation especially attractive for preference elicitation in 
general population samples where no experience with the 
outcome domain can be expected.
Furthermore, we find a higher rate of preference rever-
sal for medical students overall, and a trend suggesting that 
the increase in rates of preference reversals from money 
to health is smaller for medical students (as shown by the 
regression results in Table 6). For example, when medical 
students completed the open-ended valuation, we found 
fewer preference reversals for health than for financial 
outcomes, but not when using choice lists. This effect was 
stronger for economics students, who had a lower rate of 
preference reversal in the financial than in the health domain 
in both methods. Therefore, we find some support for our 
second hypothesis, that subjects with domain-relevant train-
ing show fewer preference reversals in their respective area 
of expertise.
Overall, we found a more substantial effect of valuation 
procedures as opposed to domain-relevant training. This may 
suggest that in our study scale compatibility [59] plays a 
larger role in generating preference reversals than impre-
cise preferences [21]. The fact that controlling for the years 
of education of respondents did not affect our findings is 
in line with this (see Appendix C). However, this experi-
ment was unable to provide conclusive evidence regarding 
this issue, as we used a between-subjects design to test for 
domain-relevant training (as opposed to studying one indi-
vidual accumulating experience). This distinction may be 
important, because even though economics and medicine 
students may differ in the content of their experience, they 
may also differ in terms of experience with participating 
in preference-based experiments. Hence, the higher overall 
rates of preference reversal we observed for medical stu-
dents may also be a reflection of imprecise preferences due 
Table 6  Results of logistic 
mixed-effects regression 
predicting the preference 
reversal by our experimental 
conditions
Bold-faced p-values are significant at α = 1%, italicized p-values are significant at α = 10%
Estimate SE Z p
Constant − 0.84 0.19 − 4.56  < 0.001
Main effects
 Discipline (medical) 0.79 0.25 3.36 0.001
 Domain (health) 0.59 0.20 2.99 0.003
 Procedure (open ended) 0.63 0.20 3.18 0.001
Interaction effects
 Domain-relevant training (medical × health) − 0.52 0.27 − 1.91 0.06
 Discipline (medical) × Procedure (open) − 0.10 0.27 − 0.38 0.71
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to the unfamiliarity or a lack of domain-relevant training 
in participating in experiments, providing support for the 
conjecture of Butler and Loomes [21]. Furthermore, while 
this study allowed us to test if the consistency in choices is 
affected by the elicitation procedure and the familiarity with 
the outcome domain, we have no way of determining what 
the ‘true preferences’ of participants would be. Moreover, 
we cannot assert that observing fewer preference reversals 
implies that elicited preferences are more aligned with such 
‘true preferences’.
Regardless of our attempts to reduce them, preference 
reversals remained prevalent. Earlier work provides several 
explanations for these findings. First, as has been shown by 
Pinto‐Prades et al. [52], choice list elicitation is a transparent 
and straightforward way to elicit preferences. This explicit 
transparency may have allowed subjects to deduce that the 
goal of this task was to observe an indifference between two 
outcomes. If respondents are aware of the goal of the task, 
this could lead to strategic choices or influences from previ-
ous choices (a consistency that does not necessarily imply 
more precise estimates of preferences). Other methods, e.g. 
the hidden choice-based procedure developed by Fischer 
and colleagues [26], reduce these influences by spreading 
elicitations over multiple items that occur in random order, 
and they have been shown to reduce the rate of preference 
reversals [26, 52].
Second, we opted to study preference reversals in deci-
sions for others, as this is relevant in real life and in the 
context of economics and medicine students’ training. Oliver 
[50] found that preference reversals occur more frequently 
in the context of social decision making. In our experi-
ment respondents advise others on decisions and, hence, 
one might object to referring to these choices on behalf of 
others as ‘preferences’ (and inconsistencies as ‘preference 
reversals’). However, similar to Oliver [50], we decided to 
also use the established term ‘preference reversal’ in a con-
text of decision making for others, since the phenomenon is 
well established under this term in the literature, although 
it needs noting that in doing so, we use the term preference 
in a broad sense.
Third, this experiment was completed using online survey 
software. Although several studies found little differences 
between lab and online studies [13, 23, 31, 54], other stud-
ies found that completing research in online environments 
may lead to higher variances or more noise (e.g. [61]. In 
our study, more noise would have been reflected in higher 
rates of preference reversals, both predicted and unpredicted. 
Given that the number of unpredicted preference reversals 
was negligible (less than 1.5%), our results give a little indi-
cation to expect a large effect of noise related to the online 
nature of the experiment.
Fourth, the recruitment procedures for the two groups of 
students differed between medical and economics students, 
but both groups were unaware of the nature of the experi-
ment until they started it. Therefore, we expect the effect of 
this difference to be small. Self-selection into the experiment 
may hamper the generalizability of our findings, as this may 
involve a biased sample of students.
Finally, related to the issue of generalizability, our (rela-
tively limited) sample comprised of 248 students of econom-
ics and medicine, which also raises the question whether our 
findings generalise to i) the general public, ii) other trained 
professionals and their respective domains, and iii) actual 
medical professionals or economists. Given the main dimen-
sions on which our sample differed from the general public 
(e.g., age, education level and wealth), which are related to 
risk attitudes [35, 37], investigating the effects of choice-
based elicitation in a general public sample would be an 
interesting venue for future research. Larger sample sizes 
would then also be more feasible to obtain. Furthermore, 
although recruitment may be time-consuming, to further 
study the effect of domain-relevant training on preference 
reversal, future work could recruit respondents working as 
trained experts in these fields, such as investment bankers 
(as in [1] or physicians (as in [18]). Although these studies 
give no indication to expect qualitatively different decision-
making, such future work could explore if the positive trend 
related to domain-relevant training is amplified when more 
decision experience is accumulated.
Conclusion
If observed preferences indeed depend on the way they are 
elicited, as we showed in this study, this is problematic. As 
long as revealed and stated preferences remain a cornerstone 
of research in health economics, such preference reversals 
offer a challenge to both empirical and theoretical work. 
Whereas preference reversals appear to be robust, occur fre-
quently and are especially prevalent in unfamiliar domains, 
we believe this study may still offer some guidance for pref-
erence elicitation in research and practice in the future. First, 
guided choice-based valuation, such as choice list elicitation, 
may be a promising tool to obtain more consistent prefer-
ences. Whether this also implies a more accurate measure-
ment of preferences remains to be seen. Second, although 
preference reversals were more common for decisions about 
health as opposed to money, we found that medicine students 
show fewer reversals in their own domain. This effect could 
have several explanations, but a positive interpretation would 
be that domain-relevant training improves consistency.
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Appendix A: Screenshots of the experiment 
(instructions and choice options)
General instructions
Thank you for participating in this survey on decision-
making about health and money. The goal of this study is 
to understand how people make choices for others for both 
financial decisions and when deciding for patients. Although 
the choices you will be making are hypothetical, please 
answer as if they were real. At the end of the experiment, 
you will receive a code, with which you can redeem your 
compensation for this study!
Practice choice question
Please assume a patient has been diagnosed with a terminal 
condition with an expected survival of 1 year. There are two 
treatments that can extend the patient’s life:
Treatment 1
85% chance of living healthy for 15 years.
15% chance of dying during treatment.
Treatment 2
60% chance of living healthy for 20 years.
40% chance of dying during treatment.
Here we would like you to select a treatment that you 
would recommend as the best option for the patient. There is 
no option of choosing neither treatment because this would 
result in the death of the patient due to the disease. Also, 
there is no right or wrong answer, we are just interested in 
your preferences between these treatments.
Practice valuation question
A patient has been diagnosed with a terminal condition 
with an expected survival of 1 year. There are two treatment 
options.
Treatment 1
70% chance of living healthy for 8 years.
30% chance of dying during treatment.
Treatment 2
100% chance of living healthy for X Years.
What is the minimum amount of X (life years) you would 
require from treatment 2 to be willing to recommend it over 
treatment 1?
This is a hypothetical question because in health care any 
type of treatment involves risks. Here we would like to know 
at which point you are indifferent between the risky (treat-
ment 1) and the certain treatment (treatment 2) so that you 
would regard them as equally good.
Some persons might consider a 70% chance to gain 8 life 
years (treatment 1) to be better than gaining 2 years with-
out any risk (treatment 2), but they would consider both 
treatments equally good if the patient would gain 5 years 
for certain from treatment 2. In this case, the answer to the 
question would be 5.
I would recommend Treatment 2 for when the minimum 
amount of X life years is:
Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and…
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Health domain—Direct choice
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Health domain—Choice list valuation procedure
Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and…
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Health domain—Open‑ended valuation procedure
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Financial domain—Direct choice
Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and…
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Financial domain—Choice list valuation procedure
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Financial domain—Choice list valuation procedure
Appendix B: Demographics questionnaire
The following questions were included to measure the demo-
graphics of our student sample.
1) What is your gender?
a. Female
b. Male
2) What is your highest educational degree?
a. No degree
b. Vocational training / apprenticeship




3) What is your field of study
a. Economics and related subjects (e.g. Econometrics, 
Health Economics, etc.)
b. Business Administration and related subjects
c. Medicine/Medical Science
d. Other
4) How would you rate your competence in statistics?
a. I had no statistical training
b. I feel somewhat competent with statistics
c. I know my way around statistics, but I’m no expert
d. I feel competent in statistics
e. My specialisation is statistics
5) In which year of your studies (starting from the Bach-
elor) are you?
6) In which country were you born?
7) How old are you?
Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and…
1 3
Appendix C: Robustness checks—logistic 
regression results
In this Appendix, we report additional regression results 
that illustrate that our main results are mostly unaffected 
by controlling for sample characteristics as well as order 
effects. We ran a series of mixed logistic regression models 
for which the results are reported in Table 7. Each model was 
similarly defined as the model reported in Table 4, which 
will be referred to as Model 1 in this Appendix, with addi-
tional fixed effects added as detailed below. We report the 
results for the following models:
– Model 2 (Sample characteristics): fixed effects for age, 
statistical competency, year of study and gender.
– Model 3 (Sample characteristics with discipline interac-
tion): additional fixed effects for sample characteristics 
that differed significantly between study disciplines, i.e. 
statistical competency, year of study and gender.
– Model 4 (Order effects): fixed effects for domain order 
(health first vs. financial first) and procedure order 
(choice list first vs. open valuation first).
– Model 5 (Order effects with interactions): additional 
fixed effects for domain and procedure order interaction.
Note that because of the modest sample size of this 
experiment we ran models with main effects and interaction 
effects separately, as our study may not be powered to test 
for the latter.
Only the introduction of interaction terms with sample 
characteristics slightly affected our conclusions, as the effect 
of students’ discipline was now marginally significant (i.e. 
p < 0.10) rather than significant at α = 1%. It appears that part 
of this effect is driven by the difference in gender composi-
tion of our samples, as after controlling for this difference 
the effect of gender was marginally significant (p < 0.10). 
This suggests that (ceteris paribus) males were less likely to 
report a preference reversal.
Table 7  Fixed-effect estimates (with SE in brackets) for mixed-effects logistics regression analyses
Bold-faced estimates are significant at α = 1%, italicized p-values are significant at α = 10%
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Main effects
 Discipline (medical) 0.84 (0.25) 0.80 (0.25) 1.17 (0.62) 0.82 (0.25) 0.81 (0.25)
 Domain (health) 0.59 (0.20) 0.59 (0.20) 0.59 (0.20) 0.59 (0.20) 0.59 (0.20)
 Procedure (open ended) 0.63 (0.20) 0.62 (0.20) 0.62 (0.20) 0.63 (0.20) 0.64 (0.20)
Interaction effects
 Domain-relevant training − 0.52 (0.27) − 0.52 (0.27) − 0.52 (0.27) − 0.52 (0.27) − 0.52 (0.27)
 Discipline (medical) × Procedure (open) − 0.10 (0.27) − 0.10 (0.27) − 0.11 (0.27) − 0.10 (0.27) − 0.10 (0.27)
Sample characteristics
 Age 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07)
 Statistical competency 0.07 (0.10) 0.14 (0.14)
 Study year − 0.12 (0.09) − 0.10 (0.10)
 Gender (male) − 0.28 (0.18) − 0.48 (0.23)
Sample characteristics: interaction
 Statistical competency × Discipline (medical) − 0.12 (0.19)
 Study year × Discipline (medical) − 0.06 (0.11)
 Gender (male) × Discipline (medical) 0.47 (0.36)
Order effects
 Domain order (health first) − 0.17 (0.16) − 0.08 (0.21)
 Procedure order (valuation first) 0.13 (0.15) 0.23 (0.21)
Order effects: interaction
 Domain order (health first) × Procedure order 
(valuation first)
− 0.19 (0.30)
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